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Extreme Risks and the Retirement Anomaly
Abstract
Extreme risks are potential events that are very unlikely to occur but which would have a significant
impact should they happen. The global financial crisis and its aftermath have demonstrated that risk
management cannot afford to stop at the 95th percentile (VaR95) and a holistic risk management
framework should include very unlikely, but potentially high impact, events. In essence we are calling for
an ‘overweighting’, whether of attention or resources, to be applied to the very low-probability, but bad,
outcomes. Why? Because we only live once. Much of finance and economics assume we have infinite
lives all running in parallel. This means that the impact of extreme risks can be masked in expected return
calculations by frequent positive outcomes. For an individual planning for retirement, a one-in-a-million
chance matters because they live in a single universe and face problems in series, not parallel. If that
individual gets the one-in-a-million path it could well be terminal – and how they would have fared on the
other 999,999 paths is of no useful interest. This paper considers a number of extreme risks. The focus is
directed more towards non-economic risks on the grounds that these have received less attention than
the more obvious financial and economic risks. However there is one economic risk that we do not think
is getting enough attention, namely whether it is possible for society to provide the retirements to which
its citizens aspire. The current consensus, among practitioners if not the general population, is that
people must save more for their retirement unless they are willing to work until they are very old. While a
sensible course of action for an individual, can this be done in aggregate? Is this not a modern version of
Keynes’s paradox of thrift? In the context of humanity’s entire history could the recent invention of
retirement be seen as an aberration from the norm (of working till you drop, or are supported by family)?
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Chapter 11
Extreme Risks and the Retirement Anomaly
Tim Hodgson
Retirement for the masses represents the briefest of anomalies over the broad
sweep of human history. While the rich have always enjoyed their leisure, most
of our ancestors worked until they were physically or mentally incapable of carrying on. The idea of self-sufficient time over many years in old age—what today
we call retirement—is a very modern invention. To explore whether the concept
of retirement is sustainable in the future, this chapter asks whether modern retirement systems are likely to be resilient to extreme risks—low-probability, but very
high-impact shocks. To do so, we evaluate how certain we are in thinking the
probability of such shocks is low and how to think about probabilistic modeling in
this context.
In what follows, we begin by considering a ‘straw man’ worldview of stability,
linear relationships, predictability, and equilibrium. Next we introduce an alternative perspective, one of complex adaptive systems with jumps, non-linearities,
and punctuated equilibria; this perspective offers less predictability and higher
likelihoods of extreme events. In this second case, it is less possible to diversify risk
across time; hence one must weight more heavily the consequences of outcomes.
Accordingly, it becomes essential to evaluate extreme risks so as to identify potential threats to retirement as we know it. In particular, we focus on political, environmental, social, and technological risks, as these receive far less attention than
the much more evident financial and economic risks. We conclude that extreme
risks matter and deserve far more attention than given thus far. Partly as a consequence but also due to economic risks, retirement for the masses is also at risk.

Alternative Worldviews
Early developers of financial economics relied on economic theory, which itself
drew on the mathematics and statistics of physics (Lo and Mueller 2010). Its initial
inspiration was Newtonian physics with its cause-and-effect approach and linear
relationships. In many economic models, therefore, the economy is assumed to
be in, or moving toward, long-term equilibrium with stable parameters through
time. Dynamics are permitted, with short-term cycles typically generated by
external shocks to the system. Moreover, economics frequently uses the phrase ceteris paribus, or ‘all else being equal,’ but this cannot hold in a dynamic system. This
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mindset has made it difficult to focus on rare ‘tail events’ and only recently have
analysts devoted much attention to developing a theory of systemic risk.
By contrast, complexity science, or the study of complex adaptive systems,1 has
as its focus how system-level conduct emerges from interactions between components (cf. Bostrom 2013). In particular, this approach explores how complex collective behavior can emerge if individual actors operate with simple rules and
lacking central control. Moreover, signaling and information processing become
key: a form of network arises when the actors produce and use information from
internal and external sources. And finally, complex systems adapt and change
their behavior over time, implying an absence of stable equilibrium.
Viewing financial markets as complex adaptive systems rather than as linear
systems tending toward equilibrium has important implications (see Table 11.1).
First, understanding each component’s behavior may not provide insight into the
system as a whole. Thus, even if all investors were fully rational optimizers, this
still may not imply rational, well-ordered, efficient markets. Second, one must
grapple with the ‘interconnectedness of all things.’2 For example, the collapse
of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 shows that counterparty risk is subject
to non-linear contagion. Third, sudden and violent regime change is possible.
Rather than returning to equilibrium after a nasty shock, it may be that turbulence endures for some time. Fourth, and most material to the consideration of
extreme risks, is that the tails of the ‘complexity distribution’ are considerably
fatter than those of the normal distribution. Complex adaptive systems tend to
have scale-free distributions (power laws), so extreme events will be much more
likely. Fifth, modeling becomes much more complex. That is, shocks can be modeled with fatter tails and higher probabilities, but complexity science has not yet
developed sufficiently to provide readily usable quantitative models for finance
and economics.

The Irreversibility of Time
The conventional approach to thinking about risk considers all possible outcomes
and weights them in accordance with their probability. In effect, the exercise
freezes time, taking multiple copies of the world and running them forward as
‘parallel universes.’ For instance, consider the following fair gamble: we will roll
a fair die and stipulate that if I roll any number from one to five, I must pay you
50 percent of your current wealth including the present value of your future earnings.3 Imagine how much better your life would be if you were one-and-a-half
times richer in the time it took to roll a die. The downside, paltry in comparison, is
that if you roll a six you must pay me your entire wealth. The expected value of the
bet is a 25 percent expected return.
While this seems attractive from an odds perspective, many would not take
the bet, perhaps because people might think about it as follows. Instead of rolling

Table 11.1 Characteristics of complex adaptive systems
Characteristica

Financial marketb

Underlying simplicity An individual buys, or sells, a security.
Many components
Many investor types, many intermediaries, exchanges, payment systems.
Many individual
Each major market has thousands of institutional investors, and multiple
actors
thousands of individual investors. The investors span markets resulting
in interconnectedness of apparently separate systems.
Coupled/interacting Transactions cause a security’s price to change, which triggers subsequent
transactions and further price changes. In addition, news flow can
cause coupling when unrelated parties trade on the same story.
Multiple spatial and
Stock price charts over different lengths of time cannot be distinguished,
temporal scales
meaning that stock price movement is scale-free with respect to time.
It is therefore better proxied by a power law distribution than a normal
distribution. This is consistent with stock price movements being
self-similar (fractals) (Mandelbrot and Hudson 2004).
Unintended
The repeal of the Glass–Steagall Act, which separated retail and
consequences
commercial banking, was justified on the grounds of increased
financial sophistication and new risk management technology.
However, in retrospect it allowed deposit-taking banks to leverage
their balance sheets, thereby contributing to the severity of the global
financial crisis.
Emergent phenomena Bubbles and busts are unintended, and are not controlled by any single
actor or group. Consequently they can be considered as a behavior of
financial markets that emerges from multiple individual interactions.
Historically
Bond market returns over the past 30 years were heavily dependent on
contingent/
yields falling from around 14% to around 2%. If we agree that yields
path-dependent
will not fall another 12% over the next 30 years (to −10%) then it
follows that bond returns cannot be as good in the next 30-year period.
Future bond returns are historically contingent on what happened
in the prior period. If returns were i.i.d. (independent and identically
distributed), the returns over the next 30 years could be the same as
in the previous 30. In equities, the concept of path dependency can be
illustrated by Soros’s concept of ‘reflexivity’ where ‘the mispricing of
financial instruments can affect the fundamentals that market prices
are supposed to reflect’ (Soros 2009).
Multiple phases
Academics have identified different market regimes in monthly returns
(regimes)
data (Kritzman and Li 2010) and over spans of a decade or more (Brock
2003). The difference in these timescales is interesting and refers back
to the multiple time scales characteristic above.
Non-linear
Most, if not all, bubbles and busts would qualify as non-linear market
events. However, there is an interesting example in the quantitative
equity crisis of August 2007. David Viniar, then CFO of Goldman
Sachs, explained that ‘we were seeing things that were 25-standard
deviation moves, several days in a row’ (Larsen 2007). This quote
inspired academic papers exploring the implications. In short, a
25-sigma event would be so incredibly rare that most other things
would be more likely. My argument is that the confluence of
quantitative equity trades caused prices to move in a non-linear way.
Robust/resilient
The global financial crisis notwithstanding, it is remarkable given the
volume and size of daily transactions, as well as the ongoing attempts
by unethical players to pervert markets for their own ends, that more
doesn’t go wrong more often.
(Continued)
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Table 11.1 (Continued)
Characteristica

Financial marketb

Adaptive/evolving

If we compare financial markets today with any previous point in time
we will see remarkable changes, and yet seldom have these changes
appeared material at the time. The underlying simplicity remains—
the buying and selling of securities—but now the trades are in
decimals, occur in fractions of a second, and may not happen on an
exchange. In addition the number and variety of securities available to
transact has ballooned, particularly derivatives.
There is no proof that can be offered to demonstrate conclusively that
financial markets do not have an underlying equilibrium. Ultimately
it comes down to an individual’s belief about how the market operates.
However, the clear exhibition of the other characteristics suggests, to
the author at least, that financial markets do not exist in equilibrium.
Instead they exhibit ‘punctuated equilibria’ where they appear to be in
equilibrium while in fact cumulative change is occurring ‘beneath the
surface’ which at a certain point leads to a non-linear jump. Hyman
Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis is an example of a punctuated
equilibrium model.
An aeroplane is complicated as it requires many different parts and
systems to come together in a precise way in order to be able to fly
safely. However it is not complex. Once those parts and systems have
been assembled according to the design the plane will fly predictably.
In contrast a complex system is non-repeatable and unique, in that
slightly different interactions will lead the system down a different
path. While not possible to rewind time and prove by experimentation,
financial markets by dint of their reflexive nature appear more likely to
be complex than complicated.

Non-equilibrium

Complicated vs
complex

This column lists the characteristics of complex adaptive systems as given in a presentation by
Geoffrey West, Distinguished Professor and Past President, Santa Fe Institute to the Foundational
Questions Institute (West 2011).
b
This column indicates how financial markets exhibit the characteristics of complex adaptive
systems.
Source: West (2011) and the author.
a

the die once in each of six parallel universes, we stay in our familiar universe
and roll the same die six times in succession: the time average takes each of the
six possible independent outcomes and makes them occur one after the other.
When we compound returns over the six periods and take the sixth-root to calculate the per-period expected (time average) return, the time average is negative
(−100 percent). In other words, the ensemble average is misleading; the 25 percent expected return unhelpfully disguises the meaningful (16.7 percent) likelihood that you lose everything. And when you have lost everything, you cannot go
back and try again.
A more subtle point is that the expected return calculation effectively underweights the impact of extreme risk. To illustrate this, consider a world in which
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one invests a portfolio of financial assets with either a good or bad outcome. In
the good case, one earns a return of 5 percent and this occurs most of the time;
in the bad case, which only occurs once in the distribution, it causes severe or
total loss. Table 11.2 shows that for a number of runs of the thought experiment, the ensemble average return exceeds the time average return. The column pairs represent worlds with different probabilities for the single extreme
outcome, starting with one-in-1,000 and moving right to one-in-100. The rows
show cases where the severity of portfolio loss rises from 99 percent in the first
row to 100 percent in the bottom row. For all 20 combinations of probability
and severity, the ensemble average return is always higher than the time average return, and in some cases significantly higher. Once the probability of the
extreme event rises to one-in-100 or higher, then 99 good outcomes of 5 percent
are wiped out by a single extreme event. Finally, note the difference in the time
average return between extreme losses of 99.999 percent and 100 percent: as
in the die-throwing experiment, once you have lost all your wealth, the game is
over and your return is −100 percent, whether that occurs in the first or the last
period. Losing 99.999 percent of your portfolio would clearly be painful, but
the little that is left can then start to grow again. This highlights the difference
between an existential risk and a risk where ‘life’ continues to the next period,
albeit in very poor shape.
Of course one might object that a 99 percent or higher portfolio loss is too
extreme to contemplate realistically. Yet some of the extreme risks discussed below
might cause financial portfolios to become worthless, and history has offered several examples of entire stock market losses. In the pension case, if the retirement
fund were a defined benefit arrangement and the plan sponsor has ceased to exist,
then a large portfolio loss could mean that the fund’s mission failed: assets will run
out before the liabilities are paid and, absent an insurance arrangement, some
beneficiaries will receive nothing. So for them, at least, this would equate to a total
portfolio loss. If the retirement fund were a defined contribution arrangement, a
large portfolio loss would not qualify as existential since there is no contractual
benefit to be broken. Instead, the adjustment is borne by individual participants,
perhaps by accepting a lower retirement standard of living than anticipated. Even
here, however, not all members are equal. A 50 percent loss for a 29-year-old is
fundamentally different to a 50 percent loss for a 59-year-old; the older participant
could perceive the loss as bordering on the existential. The practical takeaway
is that avoiding or reducing the probability of 100 percent (existential) losses is
incredibly valuable.
Using a different lens to regard the world can increase our perception of the
qualitative chances of an extreme event occurring,4 and embracing the reality of
irreversible time meaningfully increases the significance of extreme risks. Next we
consider what events might be considered extreme, in the context of their impact
on retirement systems.

4.51
4.27
4.03
3.79
−100

−99.000
−99.900
−99.990
−99.999
−100.000

4.79
4.79
4.79
4.79
4.79

Ensemble
average

Source: Author’s calculations.

∑

4.03
3.55
3.07
2.60
−00
i =1

N

Time
average

1 in 500

Notes: The ensemble average is calculated using the formula: E ( r ) =
N
T (r ) = ∏ i =1[1 + r (i )]1/ N − 1 .

4.90
4.90
4.90
4.90
4.90

Time
average

Loss given
Ensemble
extreme event (%) average

1 in 1,000

Probability of extreme event occurring:

3.06
2.12
1.18
0.25
−100

Time
average

3.96
3.95
3.95
3.95
3.95

Ensemble
average

0.23
−2.06
−4.29
−6.46
−100

Time
average

1 in 100

r (t )
. The time average is calculated using the formula:
N

4.58
4.58
4.58
4.58
4.58

Ensemble
average

1 in 250

Table 11.2 Expected returns (percent) from a distribution comprising good outcomes with a 5 percent return and a single
extreme outcome
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Identifying Extreme Risks
A large variety of risks could be included on a list of extreme events. Here we
propose a framework or set of filters that can help identify which risks are of
most import, and which can be safely ignored. Here we consider only first-order
impacts and discuss them in isolation. We do, however, make an attempt to move
toward second-order considerations in the form of an ‘association matrix,’ a qualitative assessment of whether there is likely to be a causal link between the individual risks. Moreover, context-specific risk assessment considers whether a chain
of events could occur; whether the conditional probability of a subsequent event
is substantially higher than the unconditional probability; and whether the combined events have a different scale of impact.5
Since our focus is on sustainability of the retirement system, we focus mainly
on risks that can erode assets or increase liabilities; we also omit discussion of
legal, process, and operational risks. Having acknowledged these limitations, our
overall framework consists of six categories: finance, economics, politics, environment, society, and technology. We also touch only lightly on financial and
economic categories, since these are widely commented on in other chapters in
this volume (and Towers Watson 2010, 2011). Financial extreme risks would be
sovereign default, banking crises, and insurance crises. Economic extreme risks
would include depression, hyperinflation, currency crises, and the end of fiat
money.
The six categories in our framework are not independent. In fact, some of the
most interesting insights can be found at points of confluence; see Table 11.3 (and
the Appendix). To be clear, some of these risks may seem quite extreme (and perhaps amusingly or ridiculously so). But our goal is to allow for ‘black swan’ or
highly unusual events. Within a category, the risks are listed in alphabetical order
and do not represent any form of ranking. The risks listed are also intentionally
extreme: in effect, we ask ‘is it plausible?’ or, perhaps more accurately, ‘does our
current state of knowledge suggest it is completely implausible?’ Next we evaluate,
assuming this event occurred, what the consequences might be.

Political
This category of extreme risks derives from policy decisions. In two cases, the link
is direct: global trade collapse follows policy decisions to favor protectionism over
openness and globalization, and a World War III would flow from active decisions
to declare war. For anarchy and political extremism, the link is less direct, yet
poor prior policy decisions are likely to be necessary, if not sufficient, conditions
for these risks to foment. Terrorism is included in the political category due to its
ideological foundation, and because the target chosen for the act of terrorism is
likely to have political ramifications.6

E4 Global temperature
change
E5 Natural catastrophe

E3 Cosmic threats

E2 Biodiversity collapse

Environmental
E1 Alien invasion

P4 Terrorism
P5 World War III

P2 Global trade collapse
P3 Political extremism

P1 Anarchy

Political

Invasion of non-peace-seeking extra-terrestrial beings that either remove the planet’s resources or enslave or exterminate
humanity.
The destruction of the world’s ecosystem and therefore the loss to humans of ecosystem services: provision (food and
clean water), regulation (climate and disease), support (nutrient cycles and crop pollination), and culture (spiritual and
recreational benefits).
Existential risks arising beyond earth, such as a major meteorite impact, being pulled out of orbit (or the solar system) by a
passing asteroid, or a giant solar flare (which would be compounded if it were during a reversal of the earth’s magnetic
field).
Habitable areas on the Earth are significantly reduced due to excessive heat or cold, associated with significant sea level rises
or ‘ice age’ respectively.
Earthquakes, tsunamis, hurricanes, flooding (including atmospheric river storms), and volcanic eruptions. The extreme risk
would either be a confluence of connected extreme natural catastrophes or the eruption of a supervolcano (ejecta >1,000
km3 threatening species extinction).

An extreme form of social disorder in a major economy, resulting in a loss of power by government and possible imposition of
martial law.
Extreme rise in protectionism causing global trade and investment to collapse, requiring a rise in self-sufficiency.
The rise to power in a major economy of a brutal and oppressive government, typically causing a large number of civilian
deaths and becoming a major threat to global peace (e.g. totalitarianism, whether fascism or Stalinism).
A major (ideologically driven) terrorist attack, targeted at a region of global economic and/or political importance.
A military war involving many of the world’s most powerful and populous countries causing multiple millions of deaths (could
involve a nuclear holocaust).

Table 11.3 Extreme risks by category

An instance of error or terror causing widespread deaths. The risk arises from the easy synthesis of DNA, as well as other
biological manipulations being increasingly available to small groups of technically competent and even individual users.
Politically motivated computer hacking to conduct sabotage and espionage on a national or global-power scale.
An interruption of a major infrastructure network for a relatively long period due to human behaviors, natural disasters, or
even cosmic threats.
A major nuclear accident or attack that leads to lethal effects to individuals and large radioactivity release to the environment.
An extreme risk resulting from technological advancement proceeding beyond the point of human understanding. The
creation of a computer more powerful than the human brain, which can then design and build an even more advanced
machine creating an environment where human survival is at risk.

An unanticipated, significant increase in life expectancy for much, or the majority, of humans. Possibly the result of a major
breakthrough in medical or human genome science.
Major shortfall in the supply of food, water, or energy causing political strife and widespread death and severe damage to the
quality of life for many survivors.
A reversal in the trend of improved health. Possibly caused by societal trends such as mental health problems or obesity, the
unintended consequences of current healthcare practices (e.g. antibiotic resistance), or a slowing in the rate of medical
advancement below the rate of pathogen evolution. Economic output falls and liabilities increase.
A significant increase in the scale of illegal operation in a major economy or region to the extent that legitimate economic
activity becomes non-viable.
An epidemic of highly infectious and fatal disease that spreads through human, animal, or plant populations worldwide.

Note: The risks are listed alphabetically within the categories.
Source: Author’s analysis.

T4 Nuclear contamination
T5 Technological singularity

T2 Cyber warfare
T3 Infrastructure failure

Technological
T1 Biotech catastrophe

S5 Pandemic

S4 Organized crime

S3 Health progress backfire

S2 Food/water/energy crisis

Social
S1 Extreme longevity
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Environmental
These risks represent threats to human safety and well-being arising from a disruption to the planet’s environment. Two of these, alien invasion and cosmic
threats, can be considered exogenous. While some might think that an alien invasion is too extreme to consider seriously, and its probability and consequences are
unknowable, good risk management requires taking action in advance to protect
against possible future consequences. Accordingly, the exercise is to scan the horizon with an open mind; one can always apply additional filters later, to protect
finite risk management resources. For now, all we can say is that too little is known
to rule out the possibility of an alien invasion.
Two other environmental risks, biodiversity collapse and global temperature
change, could be the result of human activity, and thus they represent serious challenges given the absence of effective global governance. Other possible sources of
both risks are shown in Table 11.4.
The final risk in this category is natural catastrophe. As earthquakes, for
example, occur every day, the extreme version of this risk is either a confluence of
extreme natural catastrophes (e.g., a magnitude 10 earthquake combined with a
25-meter tsunami, helped along by a Category Five windstorm) or the eruption of
a supervolcano.

Social
Social extreme risks are threats that could adversely affect the smooth functioning of society. As noted above, the table categories are not independent and social
risks link to policy decisions, the environment, and, in some cases, to technology.
This is clearest in the case of a food/water/energy crisis which would have political, environmental, and technological drivers, as well as offsets.
Three of the risks are health-related. Pandemics are a favorite of commentators
on extreme risks, as there are good data (at least in relative terms). Here we postulate that a new disease agent hits the ‘disease sweet spot’ of both high infectivity
and high mortality (in practice these have often been trade-offs). Health progress
backfire refers to a reversal in the trend of improved health while, working in the
other direction, extreme longevity becomes a risk when viewed through the lens of
a retirement provider. The final risk identified in this category is organized crime,
to the extent that legitimate economic activity ceases to be viable in a major country or region.

Technological
Our last category of extreme risks concerns technology. Here one might contemplate a failure in current technology (nuclear contamination or infrastructure failure); possible consequences of emerging technology (cyber warfare and biotech

4
3
4
2
4
3
1
2
2
2
3
2
2
2
3

Environmental
E1 Alien invasion
E2 Biodiversity collapse
E3 Cosmic threats
E4 Global temperature change
E5 Natural catastrophe

Social
S1 Extreme longevity
S2 Food/water/energy crisis
S3 Health progress backfire
S4 Organized crime
S5 Pandemic

Technological
T1 Biotech catastrophe
T2 Cyber warfare
T3 Infrastructure failure
T4 Nuclear contamination
T5 Technological singularity

Source: Author’s analysis.

3
1
3
2
3

Likelihood
1—one in 10 years
2—one in 20 years
3—one in 100 years
4—one in 100+ years

Political
P1 Anarchy
P2 Global trade collapse
P3 Political extremism
P4 Terrorism
P5 World War III

Table 11.4 Extreme risk scoring

H
H
M
M
H

L
L
M
M
H

H
M
M
L
M

M
M
H
M
M

Uncertainty
A degree of High (H)
Medium (M)
Low (L)

2
1
1
2
3

1
2
1
1
2

3
2
3
2
2

2
1
2
1
2

Impact—intensity
1—Endurable
2—Crushing
3—Existential

2
2
1
1
4

2
1
3
1
2

4
3
4
3
3

1
2
1
1
2

Impact—scope
1—Local
2—Global
3—Trans-generational
4—Pan-generational
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catastrophe); or a technological singularity—the point in time when humans have
designed super-intelligence into machines. What happens beyond that point is
unknowable and therefore the subject of speculation.

Assessing Extreme Risks
Next we seek to determine which of these risks might be more or less material in the
context of a retirement system. The traditional risk assessment approach would be
to learn from historical data; a qualitative overlay can be added, if for example, a
structural change is believed to have occurred. But when thinking about extreme
risks, by definition there may be no or very small historical evidence.
For this reason, we take a deliberately qualitative (deductive) approach to
the assessment process. In the first phase, a team of Towers Watson researchers
reviewed the research literature and historical data on past extreme events. Team
members then independently generated scores. In phase two, the independent
scores were compared and debated, with a single consolidated scoring approach
generated. For stage three, the consolidated scores were reviewed by a senior
committee and further refinements suggested. Hence what we propose has been
subjected to a rigorous oversight process, making our conclusions robust, albeit
qualitative.
We score each of the extreme risks in Table 11.4, and results are illustrated
graphically in Figure 11.1. Each risk has four scores: for likelihood, uncertainty,
intensity of impact, and scope of impact. For the grading of the intensity and scope
of impact we draw on and adapt the qualitative risk categories of Bostrom (2013).
These scores relate to the most extremely negative manifestation of the risk. For
instance, the consequences of earth being visited by aliens span a massive range
from the beneficial to the extinction of the human species. As we are concerned
here with extreme negative risks, it is the latter potential outcome we score. Also,
rather than assign each risk a probability (the quantitative route), we assign it one
of four categories representing a likelihood of occurrence of 1-in-10 years, 1-in20 years, 1-in-100 years, and less than 1-in-100 years. (For the technically minded,
this is akin to a high-alpha power law for the distribution and implies we believe
these events should be considered far more likely than if a normal distribution
were used.)
We split the potential impact of each risk into two separate dimensions, namely
the intensity and the scope (or geographical/temporal spread). The intensity is
assigned to one of three states labeled ‘endurable,’ ‘crushing,’ and ‘existential.’7
The scope of the impact attempts to convey both spatial and temporal information
by use of four categories: local, global, trans-generational, and pan-generational.
The first two imply a temporary impact, while the latter two imply a lasting
impact. We use ‘trans-generational’ to describe an impact affecting more than
one generation, but that would then fade or reverse. ‘Pan-generational’ refers to
an impact that would affect all subsequent or all previously potential generations
(such as extinction of the human species). Of course there is a danger that these
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two dimensions are not independent; for instance, a food/water/energy crisis
could be described as either locally crushing or globally endurable. For the majority of other cases, we believe the two dimensions are sufficiently independent to
provide useful additional information.
The final score assigned to each risk is uncertainty, assessed as low, medium,
or high. In the graphical representation (Figure 11.1), this is shown as a
semi-transparent border around the shape, with higher uncertainty shown by a
larger ‘fuzzy’ border (or ‘location’). As indicated by the shapes, the uncertainty is
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Figure 11.1. Extreme risk scoring.
Notes: the scope of the impact is shown in different shapes (Local—Square; Global—Circle;
Trans-generational—Triangle; Pan-generational—Hexagon). The size of the shape is indicative of
the level of uncertainty with regards to the likelihood/impact of each risk:
P1 Anarchy
P2 Global trade
collapse
P3 Political
extremism
P4 Terrorism
P5 World War III

E1 Alien invasion
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collapse
E3 Cosmic threats
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E5 Natural catastrophe S5 Pandemic

Source: Author’s analysis.

T1 Biotech catastrophe
T2 Cyber warfare
T3 Infrastructure
failure
T4 Nuclear
contamination
T5 Technological
singularity

228

Recreating Sustainable Retirement

in two dimensions: uncertainty regarding the likelihood, and uncertainty regarding the impact.8 Figure 11.1 is perhaps more useful for assessing the overall findings. One might have hoped that the most likely risks were endurable and the
existential risks less likely, and the Figure does show this general shape. One might
have also anticipated that local impact was more frequent than global, global
more frequent than trans-generational, and pan-generation the least frequent;
this too is the case in our view.
Of course in the retirement context, we are most interested in impacts on assets
and liabilities. If we split Figure 11.1 into three regions, the first comprises the six
points in the top right corner, which are the existential and crushing-bordering-onexistential risks. Should these events happen, we will not be particularly worried
about the assets or the liabilities, as assets are likely to be worthless and the value
of the liabilities may well have fallen to zero too. The second group comprises the
seven points to the left with crushing intensity of impact. For these events, the
effect on assets will be global and materially negative. There will also be a reduction in the value of liabilities, but as liabilities tend to be more local than assets, the
effect would be much more case-specific. That is, if your nation is at war, you lose
lives and your liabilities go down. If your neighbors are neutral, their liabilities do
not change. On balance, therefore, we would expect asset losses to be larger than
any reduction in liabilities, and so funding levels would deteriorate.
The third group is the left-most seven points (endurable intensity). These are
less homogenous, but in general we would expect a more muted impact on assets
and liabilities. The clear outlier in this group is extreme longevity, which would
explicitly increase the liabilities.

Association
As noted above, these risks are not entirely independent, so we have also developed an ‘association’ matrix (see Table 11.5). This is not a correlation matrix: correlations require data to calculate and even then they say nothing about causality.
Instead, here we use the term association to communicate that this is a qualitative
assessment of whether there is likely to be any causality between the events. If evaluating whether a particular event, X, might cause another, select X in the first column and read across the row. A blank cell means that, in our opinion, X does not
cause Y to any material extent. ‘L’ for low means that we believe X could cause Y,
or is a contributory factor. ‘H’ for high means we believe the causality is material,
so X is likely to, or will, cause Y. For example, reading across the first row of entries
shows that we believe anarchy (P1) could cause, or contribute to, global trade collapse (P2), World War III (P5), a food/water/energy crisis (S2), biotech catastrophe (T1), infrastructure failure (T3), and nuclear contamination (T4). Anarchy
is likely to cause political extremism (P3) and a sharp rise in organized crime (S4).
The table can also be read down the columns. Here column entries mean event
Y could or is likely to ‘be caused by’ events corresponding to the cell entries. As
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P1 Anarchy
P2 Global trade collapse
P3 Political extremism
P4 Terrorism
P5 World War III
E1 Alien invasion
E2 Biodiversity collapse
E3 Cosmic threats
E4 Global temperature
change
E5 Natural catastrophe
S1 Extreme longevity
S2 Food/water/energy
crisis
S3 Health progress
backfire
S4 Organized crime
S5 Pandemic
T1 Biotech catastrophe
T2 Cyber warfare
T3 Infrastructure failure
T4 Nuclear
contamination
T5 Technological
singularity

P1
P2
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trade
collapse

Table 11.5 Extreme risk association matrix
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an example, global temperature change (E4) is likely to be caused by biodiversity
collapse (E2), cosmic threats (E3), and natural catastrophe (E5). We emphasize
that this is an association matrix between only the risks we are considering, and
therefore it is silent on whether other contributory factors outside our current consideration also matter.
Many comments could be made about the associations, but here we focus on
the key ones for our purpose. The environmental risks (rows E1 to E5) are powerfully causal, so, contingent on one of them occurring, other extreme risks could
be triggered. By contrast, the social extreme risks (rows S1 to S5) have low causal
power: they are unlikely to trigger further extreme events. Yet the social risks
could have multiple triggers, as indicated by the number of entries in columns S2
to S5. This is especially the case for food/water/energy crisis (S2), attributable to
our assessment that the demand for water and food may soon start to exceed supply. With little current buffer, it would take little to tip the balance the wrong way.
We also note that there are some truly independent risks in the table. Columns
E1, E3, S1, and T5 imply that an alien invasion, cosmic threats, extreme longevity, and technological singularity are unlikely to be triggered by any of the other
extreme events considered here.
Next we create a ranking of the importance of the risks; this introduces no new
information, but rather combines the scores for each risk into a single number that
can then be ranked. The approach is straightforward: the more likely a risk, the
higher the ranking it receives. Likewise, the more certain a risk, the greater its
intensity of impact; the larger the scope of the risk impact, the higher its ranking.
The scoring necessarily involves some element of rough justice, in that it requires
trading off between, say, likelihood and intensity. But instead of focusing overly
much on precise ranking, it is more useful to arrive at an overall judgment as to
whether the ranking is satisfactory, inquiring whether the risks at the top and at
the bottom seem reasonable. Results appear in Table 11.6.
At the top of the list is a food/water/energy crisis (S2), driven by our assessment
that this is one of the most likely risks; hence there is relatively little uncertainty
attached to either its likelihood or the consequences. The consequences themselves, while locally crushing, are not globally severe (in relative terms), so these do
not imply a top ranking. In contrast, the second ranked risk, global temperature
change (E4), has much more severe consequences (trans-generationally crushing),
but it is assessed to have a lower likelihood of occurring.
It is interesting to note that the three extreme risks assessed as having the worst
consequences (existential and pan-generational) all rank in the bottom 10 overall,
with alien invasion (E1) ranked at 19. This is because their poor consequences
are diluted by our assessment of low likelihood and relatively high uncertainty.
At the very bottom is political extremism (P3), where the locally crushing consequences are not particularly severe, the likelihood is relatively low, but there is a
high degree of uncertainty over how assets and liabilities would be affected.
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Table 11.6 Extreme risk ranking
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

S2 Food/water/energy crisis
E4 Global temperature change
P2 Global trade collapse
S3 Health progress backfire
T4 Nuclear contamination
S1 Extreme longevity
P4 Terrorism
T3 Infrastructure failure
E2 Biodiversity collapse
S5 Pandemic
P5 World War III
T5 Technological singularity
E3 Cosmic threats
T2 Cyber warfare
P1 Anarchy
S4 Organized crime
E5 Natural catastrophe
T1 Biotech catastrophe
E1 Alien invasion
P3 Political extremism

Source: Author’s analysis.

As noted above, different scoring systems and weights could produce somewhat
different rankings, but the power of our approach is that it combines and trades off
the four risk scores in a consistent manner. Overall, the value of this approach is to
challenge preconceptions and highlight which risks to prioritize when it comes to
management actions.

Implications for Retirement and Retirement
Systems
Above we showed that adequate saving is necessary but not sufficient for a comfortable retirement period. And extreme risks pose a threat to the quality of retirement in terms of security and/or wellbeing, whether political, environmental,
sociological, or technological. Similarly, extreme risks pose a risk to retirement
systems. To protect against these, we require more robust investment portfolios
and balance sheets. Accordingly, we consider how to incorporate the framework
developed above in the process of managing a retirement fund’s balance sheet.
One option would be to slightly reduce expected returns, or push up volatilities
and/or correlations, so as to incorporate the impact of infrequent extreme events
(Towers Watson 2011). Another approach is to model dynamic switching: here one
must make explicit two sets of assumptions (‘normal’ and ‘extreme’), or one could
design a second, extreme risk, portfolio directly (Moore and Pedersen 2014). A third
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option is to construct a hedging overlay, though hedging comes with its own set
of problems, including high carrying cost and often the use of derivatives. Not all
extreme risks can be hedged, and hedges are imprecise. In fact, once one moves
beyond financial and economic extreme risks to confront the extreme risks described
above, hedging becomes very difficult indeed. Whether the counterparties would be
willing to and capable of paying out if the extreme event happened is also unclear.
Retirement systems have three broad hedging strategies. The first is to hold
cash; this is likely the ‘oldest, easiest, and most underrated source of tail risk protection’ (Montier 2011) and is closest to a generic hedge for all of the risks considered in this chapter. Over long historical periods, in many countries, cash has
held its real value through both episodes of deflation and inflation, but there is
no guarantee that this will be the case in the future. Cash is likely to be effective
in partially hedging risk up to and including crushing intensity, but it is likely
to become worthless once we cross over to existential intensity (all other assets
are also likely to become worthless, but the funding ratio could be quite good if
all the liabilities have been extinguished). Also there could be non-linear breakpoints between crushing intensity and existential intensity. Another consideration
regarding holding cash is which currency (or currencies) to favor. Since retirement
system liabilities tend to be domestic, there is a natural draw to domestic currency
cash. Yet this represents a relatively concentrated risk position and so a degree of
diversification may be preferable.
A second hedging strategy for retirement systems is to use derivatives, though
cost and usefulness are often in opposition. The cost of derivatives protection can
often be reduced by specifying more precise conditions for the payout, but the
more precise the conditions, the greater the chance that these will not be met
exactly, so the protection will not pay. Derivatives in the form of swaps are an
obvious way to hedge the risk of extreme longevity, but capacity is likely to be
severely constrained relative to potential demand (cf Coughlan 2014). Beyond longevity hedging, derivatives could possibly be used to help with one or two of the
risks, such as global trade collapse, or commodities futures could be used to hedge
a food/water/energy crisis. In the main, however, derivatives are probably better
suited to hedging financial and economic risks.
A third retirement system hedging strategy is to hold assets that are negatively
correlated with their liabilities. Typical hedging assets include the highest quality
sovereign nominal and inflation-linked bonds, as well as precious metals. More
creativity is probably required to handle some of the risks. For example, with
respect to a World War III, one strategy would be to hold assets in neutral countries; of course, this would require foresight and willingness to hold a portfolio
very different from that of peers. In fact, all of the political risks require some
sort of portfolio-exclusion approach, avoiding assets in jurisdictions likely to be
affected. In any event, no single asset is likely to protect against all possible bad
outcomes. Moreover, there is no guarantee that the expected performance of the
hedge asset will actually transpire in the event.
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To make retirement funds more resilient in the face of extreme risks, we suggest they undertake a prioritization exercise. At the top of the list is to focus on the
events that might permanently impair the investor’s mission, to identify which
extreme risks matter and which can be ignored. For the former, insurance is indicated since the investor cannot afford to self-insure. For the latter, an investor
should do the ‘simple’ things, including diversifying the portfolio across as many
return drivers as possible; today many institutional portfolios are heavily concentrated in equity or growth risk. Additionally it is useful to diversify within asset
classes; today most pension funds are heavily exposed to domestic sovereign bonds
for liability-matching purposes. Extreme risk thinking would suggest reducing the
quality of the match to reduce the risk concentration. Holding cash strategically
also provides optionality. And finally, over time, greater complexity can be added
assuming it passes a considered cost/benefit analysis. This is likely to involve adding long-dated derivative contracts in a contrarian manner—that is, when they
are inexpensive rather than popular.

Extreme Risks and the Retirement Anomaly
At the outset we posed the question of whether retirement in the modern sense
is sustainable or a passing anomaly. Our review of extreme risks casts doubt on
society’s ability to defer sufficient current consumption to fund future consumption. A simple model of a retirement system where individuals work for 45 years,
set aside 10 percent of earnings, and earn a real return of 3.5 percent each year,
implies that they could live for 21 years without working (Towers Watson 2012).
But all the assumptions embedded in this model require the household to build
up a pension or assets worth just over 10 times annual earnings by the retirement
date. If the population were distributed evenly by age, this would mean the economy would need to accumulate steady-state pension wealth equal to 4.7 times total
earnings, or around 235 percent of GDP.
Unfortunately, this target is far from met. The 13 largest pension markets in
the world have pension assets amounting to less than 80 percent of GDP (Towers
Watson 2013), implying much too few resources available to support retirement.
So we have either chronically undersaved for retirement and need to do better,
or other assets outside the pension system may be the answer. If the diagnosis is
chronic undersaving, it will be necessary to greatly boost saving without reducing
the rate of return on investment. Unfortunately this could result in Keynes’s paradox
of thrift: even if it is rational for an individual to save more, if everyone saves more,
the real rate of return is likely to be driven down. The same thought holds true for
non-pension saving, and so it may not be possible for society to defer consumption
in sufficient size to give people the retirement they currently expect.
It appears, then, that society will struggle to support a retired population in the
style to which it aspires. The past half-century has witnessed a historical ‘retirement
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sweet spot,’ where rising expectations were affordable due to well-documented
economic and social factors post-World War II, including favorable demographics
and the run-up in debt levels. For the future, the outlook is less sanguine.

Conclusion
This chapter has suggested that the world is a complex adaptive system.
A consequence of this perspective is that the probabilities of extreme events
are higher than anticipated by those accustomed to viewing the world linearly
and predictably. We also noted that understanding that time is irreversible for
decision-makers implies that we must give greater weight to the consequences
of outcomes and less weight to their likelihood. In turn, we must acknowledge
that political, environmental, social, and technological risks can play havoc
with the quality of life for retirees, and cause sustainability issues for retirement
systems everywhere.
The range of potential consequences of these risks is very wide. Locally
endurable risks would be uncomfortable for retirement funds caught in the
wrong locale, or with the wrong exposures, and would likely be enough to
cause the weaker funds to become incapable of completing their mission. At
the other end of the spectrum, existential and pan-generational risks represent
a systemic and terminal outcome for retirement funds, and perhaps the human
species. We also proposed a ranking system as a useful way to prioritize efforts
to consider and manage potential risk exposures. Since political, environmental, social, and technological risks are difficult to hedge, a relatively high cash
weighting appears versatile and effective. Perhaps rather than changing investment strategy, we must save more and build a larger risk buffer, a course of
action currently forced onto banks.
Among the issues we lacked space to discuss include two worth mentioning.
First, embedded in our likelihood scores is the fact that the world lacks effective
global governance, ‘G0.’9 Many of the political, social, and technological risks,
and two of the environmental risks, identified are clearly exacerbated by an
absence of effective global governance. Conversely, such governance could materially reduce the likelihood of these multiple risks. Second, we noted the possibility
that technology could ‘run amok.’ Naturally, technology has been of substantial
benefit to humankind, but many unintended consequences arise from complex
adaptive systems.
In sum, extreme risks matter and they deserve more attention than has been
given thus far. As a consequence, retirement for the masses is at serious risk, at
least in terms of current expectations regarding length, quality of life, and degree
of financial freedom. Alternatively, retirement as currently configured probably
was never affordable, but this fact was obscured by demographic and debt trends
over the past half-century.
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Appendix: A Taxonomy of Extreme Risks
The extreme risks developed in the text are described in greater detail here.

Political Risk
P1 Anarchy. The Arab Spring that started in December 2010 has removed existing rulers in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen to date. It was prompted by dissatisfaction with the rule of governments and likely by wide gaps in income levels.
Welfare cuts and unemployment during the global financial crisis fuelled protests
and anxiety across Europe. According to Europe China Research and Advice
Network, social unrest in China has been increasing at an alarming rate—8,700
‘mass incidents’ were recorded in 1993; by 2005 it had grown tenfold to 87,000 and
estimates for 2010 range between 180,000 and 230,000, highlighting an increasing
threat to the stability of the world’s second largest economy (Göbel and Ong 2012).
In a world of growing income inequality and hyper-connected communication,
the risk is an extreme form of social disorder in a major state, resulting in a loss of
power by government and causing its economy to collapse.
P2 Global trade collapse. Protectionism is the policy of restricting trade
with the aim of ‘protecting’ businesses and workers in the domestic economy
from the full force of external competition. There have been a number of studies that suggest an increase in barriers to trade since the global financial crisis
(Lowrey 2012). The concern is that short-term political expediency can override
long-term economic logic, with the extreme risk being a populist backlash against
cross-border mobility of labor, goods, and capital, causing global trade and investment to collapse. The consequences will include more uncertainty in financial
markets, greater fragmentation of capital markets, and eventually a reversal in
globalization.
P3 Political extremism. During the twentieth century, many nations suffered under extraordinarily brutal governments seeking to retain total authority
over the society and control all aspects of public and private life (totalitarianism). The Soviet Union and Nazi Germany are the two most studied totalitarian
regimes. The risk of political extremism is defined by the rise to power in a major
economy of an oppressive government (including but not limited to totalitarianism). Political extremism typically causes a large number of civilian deaths (by
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modern calculations, the Soviets killed approximately 20 million civilians, the
Nazis 25 million) and could become a major threat to global peace (Nazi Germany
directly caused World War II). Bryan Caplan from George Mason University
speculates that the chance of a world totalitarian government emerging during
the next 1,000 years and lasting for 1,000 years or more is 5 percent (Caplan 2006).
P4 Terrorism. 9/11 caused almost 3,000 deaths and the Dow Jones Industrial
Average index fell by more than 14 percent within the first week of market
reopening. New York City’s GDP was estimated to have lost $27.3 billion for
2001–2012 (Wikipedia 2013a). Its impact extended beyond geopolitics into society
and culture in general. The extreme risk here is a major ideologically driven terrorist attack of a similar, or larger, scale to 9/11, targeted at a region of global economic and/or political importance and inflicting large-scale human and financial
damage.
P5 World War III. This extreme risk is a military war involving many of
the world’s most powerful and populous countries, causing multiple millions of
deaths. One consequence of war is the destruction of capital—both physical and
human. War tends to kill those in prime ages (predominantly males), which leaves
a reduced younger workforce base and in turn reduces economic output and consumption. World War II caused deaths of between 65 and 75 million, and the
total number of deaths in wars and conflicts for the entire twentieth century was
between 136.5 and 148.5 million (Leitenberg 2006). The availability of weapons of
mass destruction means the next world war could destroy an order of magnitude
more capital than the previous ones. As Albert Einstein put it, ‘I know not with
what weapons World War III will be fought, but World War IV will be fought with
sticks and stones’ (Calaprice et al. 2005). The invention of nuclear and biological
weapons raises the possibility that the future war could put much of the human
race at risk.

Environmental Risk
E1 Alien invasion. An alien invasion is a very common theme in science fiction
stories and films, despite the fact that evidence of extra-terrestrial life has never
been documented. NASA’s Kepler mission to identify earth-size planets around
stars was launched in March 2009 and has already discovered thousands of candidates (2,740 planet candidates and 105 confirmed planets as of February 11, 2013;
NASA 2013), including one the size of Earth. The range of outcomes of an alien
life contact can be vast and entirely unpredictable, but if the contact is indeed
hostile it is more likely that the human race will be unable to defend itself due
to the potentially overwhelming technological gap. The extreme risk is therefore
an invasion of non-peace-seeking extra-terrestrials that look to either remove the
planet’s resources or enslave or exterminate human life.
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E2 Biodiversity collapse. It is estimated that less than 1 percent of the species that have existed on earth are extant and there have been five known mass
extinctions since life began on earth that led to large and sudden drops in biodiversity (Wikipedia 2013b). Human activity has accelerated the species loss and
these losses could reach a point beyond which it becomes irreversible. It is believed
earth is not far away from its sixth mass extinction. Although about 80 percent of
humans’ food supply comes from just 20 types of plant, humans use at least 40,000
species. Earth’s surviving biodiversity provides resources for increasing the range
of food and other products suitable for human use, although the present extinction
rate shrinks that potential. The subsequent destruction of the world’s ecosystem
could cause the loss to humans of ecosystem services, such as provision (food and
clean water), regulation (climate and disease), support (nutrient cycles and crop
pollination), and culture (spiritual and recreational benefits).
E3 Cosmic threats. There are risks arising beyond earth, such as a major
meteorite impact, being pulled out of orbit (or the solar system) by a passing asteroid, or a giant solar flare (the effects of which would be compounded if it were
during a reversal of the Earth’s magnetic field). The impact of these events could
range from severely inconvenient to existential. A big enough solar eruption could
trigger a magnetic storm and damage electricity distribution lines or disable critical communication and navigation systems, while a 10-kilometer-wide meteorite (like the one that hit Earth around 65 million years ago causing, as widely
believed, the extinction of dinosaurs) could release the equivalent to 100 million
megatons of energy. It is estimated that such a meteorite could trigger magnitude 10 earthquakes and a 300-meter-high tsunami spreading to all of the earth’s
coastal regions, costing millions if not billions of human lives. Noxious gases and
dust would then accumulate in the atmosphere, cutting out sunlight and potentially terminating all lives that survived the direct impact—a mass extinction
event.
E4 Global temperature change. There is little doubt in science that rising greenhouse gas emissions produced by human activities are leading to rising global temperature. Natural feedbacks (e.g. the ice-albedo feedback means
that melting ice reveals darker land and water surfaces below, which absorb more
solar heat, causing more melting and warming) in the system have the potential
of amplifying global warming. They are expected to be followed by serious consequences including more frequent extreme weather and rising sea levels (of several meters) making much of the current coastal communities uninhabitable. The
extreme risk is that the earth’s atmosphere passes a point of return and tips into a
less habitable state. On the other hand, while this thesis has gained less support in
the science community, earth’s surface and atmosphere could experience excessive cold, slipping into an ice age. This could be caused by a drop in the sun’s emission of energy (for a temporary but prolonged period), or by another extreme event
such as a meteorite strike or supervolcano eruption. In either situation, habitable
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areas will be significantly reduced, causing large-scale migration and reducing
the quality of life for most of humankind.
E5 Natural catastrophe. These are the disasters resulting from natural processes of the earth including earthquakes, tsunamis, hurricanes, flooding (including atmospheric river storms), and volcanic eruptions. The extreme risk would
either be a confluence of connected extreme natural catastrophes (e.g. a magnitude 10 earthquake causing a giant tsunami and triggering volcanic eruptions) or
the eruption of a supervolcano. The latter would cause global effects on climate
(from the ash fallout and aerosol clouds; ‘volcanic winter’), agriculture (collapse
as a result of the loss of one or more growing seasons), health (famine and spread
of infectious disease), and transportation (air travel halted for years). It is believed
that a supervolcanic event at Lake Toba around 71,000 years ago led directly to a
cooling event that lasted over 1,000 years (Zielinski et al. 1996).

Social Risk
S1 Extreme longevity. A major breakthrough in medical or human genome
science—it is hoped that cures for common banes such as heart disease, cancer,
and stroke may be in the offing—could result in an unanticipated, significant
increase in life expectancy for many, or the majority, of humans. A direct impact
of people living longer on a retirement plan is increased liabilities. In addition,
even though life expectancy has increased steadily in recent history, these gains do
not necessarily lead to better health in later life. The risk therefore also includes an
emergence of a society of a growing number of the elderly who suffer chronic but
nonfatal diseases—people live longer but their ‘productive’ years stay more or less
the same. The economy will be struggling to support the health care of a mass of
the elderly who are in need of long-term health care.
S2 Food/water/energy crisis. It was estimated in 2010 that 600 million
people in 21 countries were facing either cropland or freshwater scarcity, and
that number is projected to increase to 1.4 billion people in 36 countries by 2025.
Over one billion people live in areas where human use of available water supplies exceeds sustainable limits and by 2025 this figure is projected to rise to 1.8
billion, with up to two-thirds of the world’s population living in water-stressed
conditions (NIC and EUISS 2010). On the energy side, the supply of fossil fuels
has a known limited time span, while no viable alternatives are currently available with comparable energy returns on energy invested (EROEI). There is a risk
that the necessary technological breakthrough will not arrive in time to prevent a
global economic collapse due to an energy crisis. Consequently, given the current
fine balance between supply and demand and the projections of demand growing
faster than supply for food, water, and energy, we see this as a particular area of
vulnerability. The extreme risk refers to the occurrence of a major shortfall in the
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supply of, or access to, food/water/energy for a large proportion of the world’s
population, causing severe societal issues such as widespread death and damage to
the quality of life of many survivors.
S3 Health progress backfire. Modern medicine has been consistently
meeting existing and new diseases with new treatments, giving rise to improved
human health. There is no guarantee that the rate of medical advancement can
always outpace the rate of pathogen evolution and a catastrophic event could
emerge should biological mutation eventually outpace human innovation. This
could result from the unintended consequences of current healthcare practices
such as antibiotic resistance. The World Economic Forum warns (WEF 2013) that
we are decades behind in comparison with the historical rate at which we have
discovered and developed new antibiotics and none of the drugs currently in the
development pipeline would be effective against certain killer bacteria. Social
trends such as widespread mental health problems and obesity are additive to the
problem. Stephen Petranek, then editor-in-chief of Discover magazine, pointed out
in a TED talk that despite improved physical health, the human race is mentally
falling apart—one in five people in the west is believed to be clinically depressed
(2002). The extreme risk from a societal point of view is a massive increase in morbidity for a large proportion of the population. Not only does this directly reduce
quality of life; it would also reduce economic output. From a retirement viewpoint
the extreme risk is that the increase in morbidity is not accompanied by a reduction in longevity. In other words, economic output falls and liabilities increase.
S4 Organized crime. Organized crime is a common reality for most if not
all countries. The U.K. Home Office (2013) suggests that organized crime costs
the U.K. between £20 and £40 billion each year, and its impact is felt by the state,
businesses, communities, families, and individuals. The extreme risk is a significant increase in the scale of illegal operation in a major economy to the extent that
legitimate economic activity becomes non-viable. Extreme-form organized crime
could bring severe disruption to normal activities in affected areas, typically associated with high homicide rates, wide use of illegal drugs and the collapse of legal
business activity potentially followed by social unrest.
S5 Pandemic. Recent pandemics (e.g. SARS, avian flu, and swine flu), despite
being successfully contained (for now?), demonstrate how easily deadly viruses can
mutate and history is full of significant pandemics with an extremely high number
of causalities. For example, it is believed that the Plague of Justinian in ce 541–2
killed 50 percent of the world’s population; the Black Death in the thirteenth century caused the death of one-third of the population of Europe; and ‘Spanish flu’
during 1918–19 killed 20–50 million people (Kilbourne 2006). (We need to distinguish between those pandemics occurring before the advent of modern medicine
and those after. For example, the Black Death is believed to have been a bacterial
infection which would, today, be treated with antibiotics. However, please note
the threat of antibiotic resistance referred to in S3.) Pandemics can be attended
by high morbidity within a very short period of time (e.g. influenza), increasing
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the difficulty of developing effective vaccines in time. Modern traveling patterns make it almost impossible to contain a contagious disease within a specific
region. While we have relatively more knowledge about human disease pandemics than other events, the extreme risk here is a pandemic of a new highly infectious and fatal disease that spreads through human, animal, or plant populations
worldwide.

Technological Risk
T1 Biotech catastrophe. DNA sequencing and synthesizing machines are
available to anyone with enough money to afford a used car. Nasty nucleotide
sequences such as the Ebola virus and the 1918 influenza virus are accessible online
and genetic engineering of viruses is much less complex and far less expensive
than sequencing human DNA. This makes it a lot easier to apply this technology
to destructive uses than constructive ones. Adding to the problem is the fact that
the biotech industry is highly unregulated. Regulating and controlling current
and new developments would require strong global governance, which the world
currently lacks. British cosmologist and astronomer Martin Rees speculates that
by the year 2020, an instance of bio-error or bio-terror could have killed a million
people (Rees 2003), which is the extreme risk considered here.
T2 Cyber warfare. This refers to politically sponsored computer hacking to conduct sabotage and espionage on a national or global-power scale. It is
reported that a series of cyber-attacks on businesses and institutions in the United
States have prompted fears of a looming ‘cyber cold war’ and former United States
Defense Secretary Leon Panetta predicted a cyber-version of Pearl Harbor might
soon take the United States by surprise. Cyber war could cause severe damage
to physical infrastructure—bridges, tunnels, air traffic control, and energy pipelines. Social security, financial, and medical systems connected to the Internet
could all become the target of cyber-attacks. A cyber-attack on the defense system
might precede a military attack in all future wars.
T3 Infrastructure failure. This extreme risk refers to an interruption (prolonged but not permanent) of a major infrastructure network due to either human
activity (e.g. cyber-attack), natural disasters (e.g. earthquake or flooding), or even
cosmic threats (e.g. giant solar flare). An extended shutdown of a critical network
or electricity grid would bring increasing disruption to economies within the geographical area of impact. People’s basic needs would be threatened in such circumstances, raising the possibility of social unrest and law-breaking behaviors for
survival.
T4 Nuclear contamination. The risk is a major nuclear accident or attack
that leads to lethal effects on individuals and large radioactivity release to the
environment. It is reported that worldwide there were 99 accidents at nuclear

Extreme Risks and the Retirement Anomaly

241

power plants between 1952 and 2009 (defined as incidents that either resulted
in the loss of human life or more than US$50,000 of property damage), totaling
US$20.5 billion in property damages (Sovacool 2010). One of the worst nuclear
contamination events to date is the Chernobyl disaster which occurred in 1986
in Ukraine, killing 30 people directly, causing thousands of indirect deaths due
to radiation-induced cancer, and damaging approximately $7 billion of property
(Wikipedia 2013c). Nuclear contamination could also be a direct consequence of a
nuclear terrorist attack or a full-blown nuclear war among states.
T5 Technological singularity. This refers to an extreme risk resulting
from technological advancement proceeding beyond the point of human understanding. It is possible that the creation of a computer more powerful than the
human brain, which can then design and build an even more advanced machine,
would create an environment where human survival is at risk. Bill Joy, then Chief
Scientist at Sun Microsystems, has argued that ‘21st century technologies—robotics, genetic engineering, and nanotech—are threatening to make humans an
endangered species’ because ‘they share a dangerous amplifying factor: they can
self-replicate’ ( Joy 2000). Another possibility is a so-called nanotechnology ‘grey
goo’ scenario, in which nano-robots self-replicate in an uncontrolled manner and
eventually consume everything on the Earth (Wikipedia 2013d). The University
of Cambridge has recently established a research center named ‘The Centre for
the Study of Existential Risk,’ devoted to studying possible catastrophic threats
posed by present or future technology.

Notes
1. See for instance the Santa Fe Institute, <http://www.santafe.edu/about/history/>
(Santa Fe Institute 2013).
2. A phrase borrowed from Dirk Gently, a fictional ‘holistic’ detective who believed all
things were connected in some way (Adams 1987, 1991).
3. This is a thought experiment so we will gloss over my ability to pay; assume my credit is
pristine.
4. With extreme risks all probabilities are qualitative, however derived. By definition we
are dealing with very small sample sizes of previous occurrences so even using extreme
value theory to fit a tail distribution requires the application of significant qualitative
judgment.
5. Clustering of risks is the basis of scenario analysis which should be done; this is outside
the scope of the present chapter.
6. We acknowledge that terrorism is a weekly, if not daily, occurrence somewhere around
the world; the extreme risk here would be a terrorist act comparable to, or worse than,
9/11.
7. We do not define these states, as the labels are self-explanatory. But one might think
about oneself in the three states as follows: an endurable risk could represent a broken
leg; a crushing risk might imply the loss of a limb or paralysis; and an existential risk
might refer to the loss of self-awareness or loss of life.
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8. An extra layer of sophistication could have been added by extending the shapes in
either the vertical or horizontal direction, implying greater certainty in one dimension
and less in the other. But there is no reason to stop there; one could also move the border off-center to show that the uncertainty is asymmetric. In view of the high intrinsic
uncertainty involved when considering extreme risks, this extra sophistication would
likely provide the impression of spurious accuracy and give a false impression of the
level of signal relative to the noise.
9. This is a term and concept coined by Ian Bremmer of Eurasia Group.
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